Does a concurrent motor process influence representational momentum?

Whether the direction of a hand motion that is congruent or incongruent with a concurrent target motion can influence representational momentum for that target was examined. Participants viewed a leftward or rightward moving target while moving their hand rightward, leftward, or not moving their hand. Prior studies of mental rotation found that congruency or incongruency of the direction of mental rotation and the direction of a concurrent physical rotation of a stimulus influenced mental rotation. As mental rotation and representational momentum each involve extrapolation of target motion, it could be predicted that congruency of the direction of hand motion and the direction of target motion might influence representational momentum of the target. Robust representational momentum occurred in all conditions, but there was no effect of congruency of hand motion and target motion, nor of the presence or absence of hand motion, on representational momentum. The results are consistent with a hypothesis that the generation of representational momentum involves sensory processes rather than motor processes.

The possibility of an impetus heuristic.

Evidence consistent with a belief in impetus is drawn from studies of naïve physics, perception of causality, perception of force, and representational momentum, and the possibility of an impetus heuristic is discussed. An impetus heuristic suggests the motion path of an object that was previously constrained or influenced by an external source (e.g., object, force) appears to exhibit the same constraint or influence even after that constraint or influence is removed. Impetus is not a valid physical principle, but use of an impetus heuristic can in some circumstances provide approximately correct predictions regarding future object motion, and such predictions require less cognitive effort and resources than would predictions based upon objective physical principles. The relationship of an impetus heuristic to naïve impetus theory and to objective physical principles is discussed, and use of an impetus heuristic significantly challenges claims that causality or force can be visually perceived. Alternatives to an impetus heuristic are considered, and potential boundary conditions and falsification of the impetus notion are discussed. Overall, use of an impetus heuristic offers a parsimonious explanation for findings across a wide range of perceptual domains and could potentially be extended to more metaphorical types of motion.

Representational gravity: Empirical findings and theoretical implications.

Judgment of the location of a previously viewed moving or stationary target is often displaced in the direction of implied gravitational attraction, and this has been referred to as representational gravity. Variables that have been investigated for a possible influence on representational gravity include characteristics of the target (size/mass, velocity, distance traveled, orientation, modality), display (retention interval, response measure, height in the picture plane), context (nontarget intramodal stimuli, cross-modal components of a single stimulus), and observer (oculomotor behavior, body orientation, psychopathology), and several additional variables that might influence representational gravity but have not yet been investigated are suggested for future studies. Conclusions and speculations regarding the contribution and relationship of representational gravity to several variables, processes, and tasks (physical gravity, linear acceleration, subjective visual vertical, size/mass and weight, other biases in spatial localization, catching and intercepting a moving target, an internal model of gravity, naïve physics, a gravity heuristic, art and aesthetics) are discussed, and compatibility of representational gravity with Gibsonian and representational approaches is noted. It is suggested that representational gravity is an important adaptation that aids observers in interactions with physical objects in the environment, but that such an adaptation is not necessarily fully consistent with objective physical principles.

Momentum-like effects and the dynamics of perception, cognition, and action.

In a momentum-like effect, the likely future state of a current action or process is extrapolated. Momentum-like effects have been suggested to reflect dynamic processes, but such effects have not often been discussed in the broader literature on dynamic approaches to perception, cognition, and action. Several momentum-like effects are briefly described, and attempts to formulate dynamic theories of such effects are considered. Issues regarding dynamic representation that are relevant for theories of momentum-like effects (whether contingencies are invariant, stochastic, or arbitrary; bridging gaps between perception and action and between action and reinforcement; adaptiveness of such effects; influences of an observer's knowledge, beliefs, and expectations; relationship of momentum-like effects to naïve physics and perception of causality) are discussed. Issues highlighted by a consideration of momentum-like effects relevant for dynamic approaches to other phenomena (multiple meanings and senses of "dynamic," different meanings and connotations of "continuation" and "extrapolation," perceptual inference of subjective or objective consequences, importance of time scale and temporal information, importance of the computational theory level, momentum-like effects as an example of predictive processing) are also discussed. Momentum-like effects provide examples of relatively simple dynamic processes that reveal and highlight issues relevant for study of dynamic approaches in a wide range of perceptual, cognitive, and action phenomena.

Does Allocation of Attention Influence Relative Velocity and Strength of Illusory Line Motion?

In illusory line motion, presentation of a cue is followed by presentation of a nearby stationary line, and the line is perceived to "unfold," "expand," or "extend" away from the cue. Effects of the allocation of attention regarding where the cue or the line would be presented were measured in three experiments, and ratings of relative velocity and relative strength of illusory motion were collected. Findings included (a) relative velocity and relative strength decreased with increases in SOA from 50 to 450 ms, (b) relative velocity and relative strength were not influenced by whether illusory motion moved from one end of the line to the other or from both ends toward the middle of the line, (c) increased uncertainty regarding where the line would appear did not influence relative velocity or relative strength, and (d) valid pre-cues regarding the location of a cue resulted in faster relative velocity than did invalid pre-cues, but pre-cue validity did not influence relative strength. Implications of these findings for the relationship of such illusory motion and attention (e.g., divided attention, shifts in attended location) are considered.

Representational momentum and anisotropies in nearby visual space.

The possibility of anisotropies in visual space in and near the final location of a moving target was examined. Experiments 1 and 2 presented a moving target, and after the target vanished, participants indicated the final location of the leading or trailing edge of the target. Memory for both edges was displaced forward from the actual final locations, and the magnitude of displacement was smaller for the leading edge. Experiments 3 and 4 also presented stationary objects in front of and behind the final location of the target, and participants indicated the location of the nearest or farthest edge of one of the stationary objects. Memory for the near or far edge of an object in front of the target was displaced backward, and memory for the near or far edge of an object behind the target was displaced forward; the magnitude of displacement was larger for objects in front of the target and when the edge was farther away. The findings (a) suggest representational momentum is associated with an anisotropy of visual space that extends across and outward from the moving target and (b) are consistent with previous findings regarding estimation of time-to-contact, anorthoscopic perception, and memory psychophysics.

Ear Advantage for Musical Location and Relative Pitch: Effects of Musical Training and Attention.

Trained musicians have been found to exhibit a right-ear advantage for high tones and a left-ear advantage for low tones. We investigated whether this right/high, left/low pattern of musical processing advantage exists in listeners who had varying levels of musical experience, and whether such a pattern might be modulated by attentional strategy. A dichotic listening paradigm was used in which different melodic sequences were presented to each ear, and listeners attended to (a) the left ear or the right ear or (b) the higher pitched tones or the lower pitched tones. Listeners judged whether tone-to-tone transitions within each melodic sequence moved upward or downward in pitch. Only musically experienced listeners could adequately judge the direction of successive pitch transitions when attending to a specific ear; however, all listeners could judge the direction of successive pitch transitions within a high-tone stream or a low-tone stream. Overall, listeners exhibited greater accuracy when attending to relatively higher pitches, but there was no evidence to support a right/high, left/low bias. Results were consistent with effects of attentional strategy rather than an ear advantage for high or low tones. Implications for a potential performer/audience paradox in listening space are considered.

Toward a general theory of momentum-like effects.

The future actions, behaviors, and outcomes of objects, individuals, and processes can often be anticipated, and some of these anticipations have been hypothesized to result from momentum-like effects. Five types of momentum-like effects (representational momentum, operational momentum, attentional momentum, behavioral momentum, psychological momentum) are briefly described. Potential similarities involving properties of momentum-like effects (continuation, coherence, role of chance or guessing, role of sensory processing, imperviousness to practice or error feedback, shifts in memory for position, effects of changes in velocity, rapid occurrence, effects of retention interval, attachment to an object rather than an abstract frame of reference, nonrigid transformation) are described, and potential constraints on a future theory of momentum-like effects (dynamic representation, nature of extrapolation, sensitivity to environmental contingencies, bridging gaps between stimulus and response, increasing adaptiveness to the environment, serving as a heuristic for perception and action, insensitivity to stimulus format, importance of subjective consequences, role of knowledge and belief, automaticity of occurrence, properties of functional architecture) are discussed. The similarity and ubiquity of momentum-like effects suggests such effects might result from a single or small number of mechanisms that operate over different dimensions, modalities, and time-scales and provide a fundamental adaptation for perception and action.

Perceived causality, force, and resistance in the absence of launching.

In the launching effect, a moving object (the launcher) contacts a stationary object (the target), and upon contact, the launcher stops and the target begins moving in the same direction and at the same or slower velocity as previous launcher motion (Michotte, 1946/1963). In the study reported here, participants viewed a modified launching effect display in which the launcher stopped before or at the moment of contact and the target remained stationary. Participants rated perceived causality, perceived force, and perceived resistance of the launcher on the target or the target on the launcher. For launchers and for targets, increases in the size of the spatial gap between the final location of the launcher and the location of the target decreased ratings of perceived causality and ratings of perceived force and increased ratings of perceived resistance. Perceived causality, perceived force, and perceived resistance exhibited gradients or fields extending from the launcher and from the target and were not dependent upon contact of the launcher and target. Causal asymmetries and force asymmetries reported in previous studies did not occur, and this suggests that such asymmetries might be limited to typical launching effect stimuli. Deviations from Newton's laws of motion are noted, and the existence of separate radii of action extending from the launcher and from the target is suggested.

The varieties of momentum-like experience.

Cognition and behavior exhibit biases consistent with future expectations, and some of these biases result in momentum-like effects and have been linked with the idea of momentum. These momentum-like effects include representational momentum, operational momentum, attentional momentum, behavioral momentum, and psychological momentum. Effects of numerous variables involving characteristics of the target, display, context, or observer on each momentum-like effect are considered, and similarities of different momentum-like effects are considered. It is suggested that representational momentum, operational momentum, and attentional momentum reflect similar or overlapping mechanisms based on a perceptual time-scale and extrapolation primarily across space, and that behavioral momentum and psychological momentum reflect similar or overlapping mechanisms based on a longer time-scale and extrapolation primarily across time. It is further suggested that all 5 forms of momentum-like effect could reflect a more general extrapolation mechanism that anticipates the future action, behavior, or outcome of a given target, person, or process. A list of properties characterizing momentum-like effects is proposed, and constraints and issues relevant to future models of momentum-like effects are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

Forms of momentum across space: representational, operational, and attentional.

Cognition can exhibit biases consistent with future expectations, and some of these biases result in momentum-like effects and have been linked with the idea of an internalization of the effects of momentum. These momentum-like effects include representational momentum, operational momentum, and attentional momentum. Similarities and differences between these different momentum-like effects are considered. Hubbard's (2005) review of representational momentum is updated to include studies published since that review appeared, and the first full reviews of operational momentum and attentional momentum are provided. It is suggested that (1) many variables that influence one of these momentum-like effects have a similar influence on another momentum-like effect, (2) representational momentum, operational momentum, and attentional momentum reflect similar or overlapping mechanisms, and operational momentum and attentional momentum are special cases of representational momentum, and (3) representational momentum, operational momentum, and attentional momentum reflect properties of a more general spatial representation in which change or transformation of a stimulus is mapped onto motion in a spatial coordinate system.

An effect of contrast and luminance on visual representational momentum for location.

Effects of the contrast of target luminance and background luminance, and of the absolute level of target luminance, on representational momentum for the remembered final location of a previously viewed moving target were examined. Targets were high in contrast or luminance, decreasing in contrast or luminance, increasing in contrast or luminance, or low in contrast or luminance; the background was black or white. Representational momentum for target location was larger if targets were high or increasing in contrast or luminance and smaller if targets were low or decreasing in contrast or luminance. Representational momentum for target location was larger if targets were presented on a white background than on a black background. Implications for theories of localization and for theories of representational momentum are discussed.

The flash-lag effect and related mislocalizations: findings, properties, and theories.

If an observer sees a flashed (briefly presented) object that is aligned with a moving target, the perceived position of the flashed object usually lags the perceived position of the moving target. This has been referred to as the flash-lag effect, and the flash-lag effect has been suggested to reflect how an observer compensates for delays in perception that are due to neural processing times and is thus able to interact with dynamic stimuli in real time. Characteristics of the stimulus and of the observer that influence the flash-lag effect are reviewed, and the sensitivity or robustness of the flash-lag effect to numerous variables is discussed. Properties of the flash-lag effect and how the flash-lag effect might be related to several other perceptual and cognitive processes and phenomena are considered. Unresolved empirical issues are noted. Theories of the flash-lag effect are reviewed, and evidence inconsistent with each theory is noted. The flash-lag effect appears to involve low-level perceptual processes and high-level cognitive processes, reflects the operation of multiple mechanisms, occurs in numerous stimulus dimensions, and occurs within and across multiple modalities. It is suggested that the flash-lag effect derives from more basic mislocalizations of the moving target or flashed object and that understanding and analysis of the flash-lag effect should focus on these more basic mislocalizations rather than on the relationship between the moving target and the flashed object.

Do the flash-lag effect and representational momentum involve similar extrapolations?

In the flash-lag effect (FLE) and in representational momentum (RM), the represented position of a moving target is displaced in the direction of motion. Effects of numerous variables on the FLE and on RM are briefly considered. In many cases, variables appear to have the same effect on the FLE and on RM, and this is consistent with a hypothesis that displacements in the FLE and in RM result from overlapping or similar mechanisms. In other cases, variables initially appear to have different effects on the FLE and on RM, but accounts reconciling those apparent differences with a hypothesis of overlapping or similar mechanisms are suggested. Given that RM is simpler and accounts for a wider range of findings (i.e., RM involves a single stimulus rather than the relationship between two stimuli, RM accounts for displacement in absolute position of a single stimulus and for differences in relative position of two stimuli), it is suggested that (at least some cases of) the FLE might be a special case of RM in which the position of the target is assessed relative to the position of another stimulus (i.e., the flashed object) rather than relative to the actual position of the target.

A Fröhlich effect and representational gravity in memory for auditory pitch.

Memory for the initial pitch of an auditory target that increased or decreased in auditory frequency was examined. Memory was displaced forward in the direction of pitch motion, and this is consistent with the Fröhlich effect previously observed for visual targets moving in visual physical space. The Fröhlich effect for pitch increased with faster target velocity and decreased if an auditory cue with the same pitch as the initial pitch of the target was presented before the target was presented. The Fröhlich effect was larger for descending pitch motion than for ascending pitch motion, and this is consistent with an influence of representational gravity. The data suggest that representation of auditory frequency space exhibits some of the same biases as representation of visual physical space, and implications for theories of attention in displacement and for crossmodal and multisensory representation of space are discussed.

Displacement of location in illusory line motion.

Six experiments examined displacement in memory for the location of the line in illusory line motion (ILM; appearance or disappearance of a stationary cue is followed by appearance of a stationary line that is presented all at once, but the stationary line is perceived to "unfold" or "be drawn" from the end closest to the cue to the end most distant from the cue). If ILM was induced by having a single cue appear, then memory for the location of the line was displaced toward the cue, and displacement was larger if the line was closer to the cue. If ILM was induced by having one of two previously visible cues vanish, then memory for the location of the line was displaced away from the cue that vanished. In general, the magnitude of displacement increased and then decreased as retention interval increased from 50 to 250 ms and from 250 to 450 ms, respectively. Displacement of the line (a) is consistent with a combination of a spatial averaging of the locations of the cue and the line with a relatively weaker dynamic in the direction of illusory motion, (b) might be implemented in a spreading activation network similar to networks previously suggested to implement displacement resulting from implied or apparent motion, and (c) provides constraints and challenges for theories of ILM.

Visual perception of force: comment on White (2012).

White (2012) proposed that kinematic features in a visual percept are matched to stored representations containing information regarding forces (based on prior haptic experience) and that information in the matched, stored representations regarding forces is then incorporated into visual perception. Although some elements of White's (2012) account appear consistent with previous findings and theories, other elements do not appear consistent with previous findings and theories or are in need of clarification. Some of the latter elements include the (a) differences between perception and impression (representation of force; relationship of force and resistance; role and necessity of stored representations and of concurrent simulation; roles of rules, cues, and heuristics), (b) characteristics of object motion and human movement (whether motion is internally generated or externally generated and whether motion is biological or nonbiological; generalization of human action and the extent to which perceived force depends upon similarity of object movement to human patterns of movement), (c) related perceptual and cognitive phenomena (representational momentum, imagery, psychophysics of force perception, perception of causality), and (d) scope and limitations of White's account (attributions of intentionality, falsifiability).

Auditory memory distortion for spoken prose.

Observers often remember a scene as containing information that was not presented but that would have likely been located just beyond the observed boundaries of the scene. This effect is called boundary extension (BE; e.g., Intraub & Richardson, 1989). Previous studies have observed BE in memory for visual and haptic stimuli, and the present experiments examined whether BE occurred in memory for auditory stimuli (prose, music). Experiments 1 and 2 varied the amount of auditory content to be remembered. BE was not observed, but when auditory targets contained more content, boundary restriction (BR) occurred. Experiment 3 presented auditory stimuli with less content and BR also occurred. In Experiment 4, white noise was added to stimuli with less content to equalize the durations of auditory stimuli, and BR still occurred. Experiments 5 and 6 presented trained stories and popular music, and BR still occurred. This latter finding ruled out the hypothesis that the lack of BE in Experiments 1-4 reflected a lack of familiarity with the stimuli. Overall, memory for auditory content exhibited BR rather than BE, and this pattern was stronger if auditory stimuli contained more content. Implications for the understanding of general perceptual processing and directions for future research are discussed.

Effects of spatial cuing on the onset repulsion effect.

Effects of cuing the onset (initial) location of a moving target on memory for the onset location of that target were examined. If a cue presented prior to target onset indicated the location where that target would appear, the onset repulsion effect (in which the judged initial location of the target was displaced in the direction opposite to target motion) was decreased, and the onset repulsion effect was smaller if the cue was valid than if the cue was invalid. If a cue presented during target motion or after the target vanished indicated the location where that target had appeared, the onset repulsion effect was eliminated. The data (1) suggest that positional uncertainty might contribute to the onset repulsion effect, (2) provide the first evidence of an effect of expectancy regarding target trajectory on the onset repulsion effect, and (3) are partially consistent with previous data involving effects of attention and spatial cuing on the Fröhlich effect and on representational momentum.

Effects of temporal and spatial separation on velocity and strength of illusory line motion.

The effects of line length and of spatial or temporal distance on illusory line motion (i.e., on the perception that a stationary line unfolds or expands away from a previously presented stationary cue) were examined in five experiments. Ratings of relative velocity decreased with increases in stimulus onset asynchrony between appearance of the cue and appearance of the line (from 50 to 450 ms), whereas the extremity of ratings of direction (i.e., strength of the ratings of illusory line motion) increased with increases in stimulus onset asynchrony (from 50 to either 250 or 450 ms). Ratings of relative velocity increased with increases in line length, whereas ratings of direction were not influenced by increases in line length. Ratings of relative velocity and direction were not influenced by increases in the distance of the near or the far end of the line from the cue. Implications of these data for attentional theories and apparent-motion theories of illusory line motion are discussed.